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SUSTAINABLE ALT-LABOR
CATHERINE L. FISK *
INTRODUCTION
Contemporary labor organizing, with all its vibrance, variety, and vigor, seems to be in a virtuous cycle in which organizing success prompts
favorable public attention, which in turn contributes to more organizing.
More employees struck in 2019 than in any year since 1986. 1 Since 2010,
support for unions has climbed from less than half of Americans polled to
about three-fifths. 2 Some economists now believe that unions are “a critical
check on the tendency of capital to vacuum up the gains from economic
growth.” 3
The institutions, movement, and organizing of labor today differ, in
some ways quite markedly, from those that existed when the legal regimes
governing work were developed. How organizations form and represent
workers, how labor organizations relate to employers and consumers, what
are desired subjects of labor negotiation, and how minimum standards laws
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* Barbara Nachtrieb Armstrong Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley. Portions of this
essay (in particular, the discussion of social movements in Part II and the two reforms proposed in Part
III) draw heavily on prior work co-authored with others. I am grateful to Seema Patel, Diana Reddy,
Jennifer Abruzzo, and David Rolf for their work that made it possible for me to do the synthesis and
elaboration in this article, to Laura Weinrib for perceptive comments, and to Michael Oswalt, Cesar
Rosado Marzan, and the staff of the Chicago-Kent Law Review for organizing the Alt-Labor symposium for which this essay was written.
1. Scott Horsley, ‘It’s Time To Get Something Back’: Union Workers’ Voices Are Getting
Louder, NPR (Oct. 23, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/10/23/772760183/it-s-time-to-get-somethingback-union-workers-voices-are-getting-louder [https://perma.cc/U8QK-8C4E].
2. Shiva Maniam, Most Americans See Labor Unions, Corporations, Favorably, PEW RES. CTR.
(Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/01/30/most-americans-see-labor-unionscorporations-favorably/ [https://perma.cc/P6YK-5BBW]; Drew Desilver, Most Americans View Unions
Favorably, Though Few Workers Belong to One, PEW RES. CTR. (Aug. 30, 2018),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/08/30/union-membership-2/
[https://perma.cc/X59C4NUZ]; Favorability Ratings of Labor Unions Fall Sharply, PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 23, 2010),
https://www.people-press.org/2010/02/23/favorability-ratings-of-labor-unions-fall-sharply/
[https://perma.cc/6BGA-UWDK].
3. Noam Scheiber, Candidates Grow Bolder on Labor, and Not Just Bernie Sanders, N.Y.TIMES
(Oct.11, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/11/business/economy/democratic-candidates-laborunions.html [https://perma.cc/XX2G-432R] (citing Henry Farber et al., Unions and Inequality Over the
Twentieth Century: New Evidence from Survey Data (Princeton Univ. Working Paper No. 620, 2018),
http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp01gx41mm54w. Among the prominent economists focused on
the reasons for and the hazards of rising economic inequality, one might list Joseph Stiglitz, Thomas
Piketty, and many others.
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intersect with collective agreements are evolving as the nature of work
evolves. Even where the organizational forms and tactics look similar—
such as recent strikes by unionized teachers in Chicago, Los Angeles, and
Oakland, auto workers at GM, or telecom workers at Verizon—many of the
goals are radically different. Teachers, for example, have struck for the
common good—an end to the disinvestment in public education—not just,
or not even, a pay raise. 4 Beyond the blue states with strong teachers’ unions, many of the strikes were led by groups formed on Facebook, not by
union leaders. 5 Worker centers nationwide are organizing millions of lowwage immigrant workers to demand compliance with minimum wage laws
even where a union and collective bargaining are far beyond what the
workers could imagine. And a host of organizations, working with and
sometimes without unions, have supported the Google walkout, organizing
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4. See, e.g., Holly Yan, Oregon Teachers Are Walking Out, Forcing 600 Schools to Close. But
They’re Not Demanding Raises, CNN (May 8, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/08/us/oregonteachers-walkout/ [https://perma.cc/U8A9-VTVJ]. In the negotiations that led up to the Los Angeles
teachers’ strike of 2018, the United Teachers of Los Angeles made a package of proposals that the
teachers labeled “Supporting our Students and Empowering our Community.” One was that the Los
Angeles Unified School District (“LAUSD”) work toward creating 20 “community schools” in highneed areas. A second was that the district develop a plan to expand access to early education. A third
proposal asked the district to remove unused bungalows on campuses to make room for more green
space for student athletic activities. A fourth would require an “education impact report” and a “community impact report” as part of the authorization process for a new charter school or a new public
school. A fifth asked the district to provide on campus support for homeless students, including counseling and contacts with nonprofit organizations on housing assistance. A sixth sought to require the
district to collaborate with labor to develop a plan for certificated employees to support classified
employees who are accessing the Training Fund to become teachers. A seventh sought support for
immigrant students’ families by training district personnel on the protocols for district interactions with
the U.S. Department of Immigration & Customs Enforcement, by creating a $1,000,000 fund to support
families of LAUSD students facing deportation of a student or family member, and developing a plan to
locate immigrant support clinics that could provide on-site support at LAUSD schools. An eighth
proposal was to cease subjecting students to “random” metal detector and locker searches, to provide
fare-free ridership on all MTA buses and all trains for all LAUSD students, to support efforts to end the
MTA’s disproportionate number of citations, fines, and “stop & frisks” for those under the age of
twenty-one, and to offer support services for students who need help addressing legal issues arising
from these situations relating to the MTA. The ninth, and perhaps most ambitious, proposal asked the
district to approve a resolution in support of and to formally advocate that Los Angeles schools be
funded at $20,000 per pupil by the year 2020.
LAUSD filed an unfair practice charge against the Union that UTLA insisted to impasse on the Community Proposals and that they were outside the scope of bargaining. Unfair Practice Charge, Los
Angeles Unified School District v. United Teachers Los Angeles, PERB Case No. LA-CO-1760-E (Aug.
28, 2018). The California PERB issued a complaint on the LAUSD charge, but the questions whether
the LAUSD’s failure to inform UTLA whether it was willing to discuss the proposals, or whether some
or all were outside the scope of the duty to bargain over mandatory subjects, were among the many
legal issues left unresolved in the wake of the strike settlement.
5. See Michael M. Oswalt, Alt-Bargaining, 82 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89 (2019). In California,
the teachers’ union is pushing a ballot measure, which they call the “Schools and Communities First”
initiative, that would close commercial property tax loopholes in order to increase revenues for schools.
Julian Peeples, CTA Kicks Off Campaign to Put Schools and Communities First, CALIFORNIA
EDUCATOR (Oct. 27, 2019), https://californiaeducator.org/2019/10/27/cta-kicks-off-campaign-to-putschools-and-communities-first/ [https://perma.cc/7KVS-XBHT].
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of gig workers, a $15 minimum wage, labor rights for domestic and home
care workers, an end to misclassification as contractors, and an end to the
tipped employees’ subminimum wage so as to end sexual harassment for
restaurant workers. 6
These new forms and activities of labor organization and protest, and
new forms of labor market intervention and intermediation are the AltLabor phenomenon. 7 To build enduring worker power from the activism
and organizations of Alt-Labor requires thinking about how law could help
create institutional leverage for worker groups. 8 Institutional leverage will
make Alt-Labor gains sustainable. But history teaches that capitalists are
patient and indefatigable whenever they think they can make more money
if labor is cheaper. For example, the gains of the New Deal have been all
but lost in the deregulation and union-busting since 1970. 9 If today’s organizing produces a new wave of labor power in blue states or nationally,
those gains will be vulnerable to a pro-business counter-revolution. 10
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6. See generally SARU JAYARAMAN, FORKED: A NEW STANDARD FOR AMERICAN DINING
(2016); DAVID ROLF, THE FIGHT FOR FIFTEEN: THE RIGHT WAGE FOR A WORKING AMERICA (2016);
see generally Sameer M. Ashar & Catherine L. Fisk, Democratic Norms and Governance Experimentalism in Worker Centers, 82 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 141 (2019) (collecting citations to the literature on
new forms of labor organizing, activism, and representation, especially in low-wage, immigrant, female-dominated work).
7. The literature on this is large and growing. See, e.g., M. Anne Visser et al., From Economic
Integration to Socioeconomic Inclusion: Day Labor Worker Centers as Social Intermediaries, 38
URBAN GEOGRAPHY 243, 247 (2017); CHRIS ZEPEDA-MILLÁN, LATINO MASS MOBILIZATION:
IMMIGRATION, RACIALIZATION, AND ACTIVISM (2017); Janice Fine, Community Unions and the Revival
of the American Labor Movement, 33 POL. & SOC’Y 153 (2005); JANICE FINE, WORKER CENTERS:
ORGANIZING COMMUNITIES AT THE EDGE OF THE DREAM (2006); SHANNON GLEESON, CONFLICTING
COMMITMENTS: THE POLITICS OF ENFORCING IMMIGRANT WORKER RIGHTS IN SAN JOSE AND
HOUSTON (2012); JENNIFER GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS: THE FIGHT FOR IMMIGRANT RIGHTS
(2005); SANDRA LAZO DE LA VEGA & TIMOTHY J. STEIGENGA, AGAINST THE TIDE: IMMIGRANTS, DAY
LABORERS, AND COMMUNITY IN JUPITER, FLORIDA (2013); RUTH MILKMAN ET AL., WORKING FOR
JUSTICE: THE L.A. MODEL OF ORGANIZING AND ADVOCACY (2010); RUTH MILKMAN & ED OTT, NEW
LABOR IN NEW YORK: PRECARIOUS WORKERS AND THE FUTURE OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT (2014).
8. See Michael M. Oswalt & César F. Rosado Marzán, Organizing the State: The “New Labor
Law” Seen from the Bottom-Up, 39 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 415 (2018) (asserting, based on
ethnographic study of new forms of labor protection, there is need for more law urging or mandating
collaboration between worker organizations, employers, and government agencies).
9. See Nelson Lichtenstein, From Corporatism to Collective Bargaining: Organized Labor and
the Eclipse of Social Democracy in the Postwar Era, in THE RISE AND FALL OF THE NEW DEAL ORDER,
1930-1980 (Steve Fraser & Gary Gerstle, eds., 1989); JEFFERSON COWIE, THE GREAT EXCEPTION: THE
NEW DEAL AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN POLITICS (2016); STEVEN GREENHOUSE, BEATEN DOWN,
WORKED UP: THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF AMERICAN LABOR (2019).
10. On the fragility of social change that is achieved only through networked activism rather than
through institutional change, see ZEYNEP TUFEKCI, TWITTER AND TEAR GAS: THE POWER AND
FRAGILITY OF NETWORKED PROTEST (2017) (analyzing how the internet and social media enabled
protest movements to gain significant power around the globe, including in the Arab Spring uprisings of
2011 and elsewhere, but explaining why many such protests failed to achieve lasting change).
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Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law, 126 YALE L.J. 2, 8 (2016).
Oswalt, supra note 5, at 96.

06/12/2020 13:18:38
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Some Alt-Labor formations use mobilization for legal change as a basis for forming sustainable sectoral organizations. Grassroots campaigns to
push for new legislation, and to push for compliance with existing legislation, engage workers at a local level on sector-wide issues. As Kate Andrias has shown, it is a first step toward sectoral bargaining. 11 And there will
always be the next campaign to improve labor standards through state and
local legislation. But the key to long-term sustainability is to understand
how organizations sustain engagement or otherwise exert power after the
push for a particular piece of policy change has passed.
Looking at successful state campaigns to enact new labor laws— protections for informal workers (day laborers and domestic workers), improved minimum standards in food service, and litigation and legislative
strategies to eliminate misclassification of workers as independent contractors—this essay considers how the campaigns that have mobilized workers
have sought to institutionalize the gains of movement activism. The essay
then draws on the experience of the United Farm Workers under the California Agricultural Labor Relations Act, which won a major legislative
reform but failed (to this point) to build a sustainable union, and teachers’
unions which have recently revolutionized public employee bargaining and
activism, to raise questions about how the new generation of worker formations are addressing the sustainability challenge that all social movements face.
A successful labor organization is one that has a mechanism to transform the mobilized energy of a social movement into sustainable worker
power. Unions have kept members mobilized to secure collective bargaining agreements and, in the interim, have offered the benefits of the contract.
Collective bargaining agreements translate the power that is gained through
activism into enduring improvements in working conditions, relying on
institutional power as a partial antidote to activism fatigue. As Michael
Oswalt has shown, Alt-Labor has transformed collective bargaining in
many ways. 12 But worker centers and nonprofits need more ways in which
gains in worker power secured through the new wave of organizing and
activism can be institutionalized and sustainable without constant social
movement activism.
As described in Part III, two state or local legal changes would facilitate sustainability and could operate as a form of proto-sectoral bargaining.
One is co-enforcement, which gives alt-labor formations an institutional
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role in enforcing labor standards laws. A second is the expansion of hiring
halls, perhaps even a requirement that any job-matching service involves
worker formations in its operation. They are, in a sense, proto-sectoral bargaining that will enable worker formations to keep members engaged and
build a sustainable organization to combat the activism fatigue that can
weaken social movements over the long term.
I. THE SECTORAL AND CAMPAIGN MODELS OF WORKER ORGANIZING

06/12/2020 13:18:38

13. For a recent discussion of the backlash thesis and a response to it in the case of same-sex
marriage litigation, see Reva B. Siegel, Community in Conflict: Same-Sex Marriage and Backlash, 64
UCLA L. REV. 1728 (2017).
14. Social exclusion is “the marginalization of individuals and groups from ‘mainstream’ social,
economic, and political . . . structures.” Visser et al., supra note 7, at 243.
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The dominant mode of alt-labor action has been organizing, and in
particular the campaign around creating new law or enforcing existing law.
Yet the social movement literature cautions advocates of progressive law
reform to beware the backlash that often follows the in-the-streets and inthe-courts phase of social movement organizing. 13 The dangers of backlash
and exhaustion are compounded in the area of labor standards because
repressive immigration law, the multidimensional nature of socioeconomic
inequality, and the fissuring and informalization of work generate social
exclusion and demand more labor market intermediation.14 Alt-labor formations have in many cases effectively combatted social exclusion through
activism. But a regulatory regime should not depend on constant activism
and should instead create structures that normalize compliance.
Legal reforms can both create sustainability and facilitate social and
economic inclusion by giving worker organizations a formal role to play in
regulating, not just an informal role in labor market regulation.
As immigration law has become ever harsher and economic restructuring and deregulation have rendered immigrant and low-wage workers ever
more marginalized, worker organizations and other community formations
have scored some notable successes in demarginalizing vulnerable workers.
They also play a role in improving the skills of the workforce and regularizing the labor market in ways that benefit employers and consumers. In
this section, I explore how worker organizations in three sectors—
“informal” work (day labor and domestic work), food service, and the appbased gig economy—have forged their role. Yet, their role remains focused
on activism and campaigns, and the long-term viability and power of these
organizations may depend on their development into sustainable labor mar-
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ket and social institutions for the benefit of workers, employers, and the
public.
A. “Informal” Work

06/12/2020 13:18:38

15. Hugo Sarmiento et al., The Unexpected Power of Informal Workers in the Public Square: A
Comparison of Mexican and US Organizing Models, 89 INT’L LAB. & WORKING-CLASS HIST. 131, 132
(2016) (explaining why, “[d]espite their apparent vulnerability,” Mexican street vendors and U.S. day
laborers “have built perhaps the most powerful informal worker organizations in their countries.”).
16. Chris Tilly, Georgina Rojas-Garcia & Nik Theodore, Intersectional Histories, Overdetermined Fortunes: Understanding Mexican and US Domestic Worker Movements, in GENDERING
STRUGGLES AGAINST INFORMAL AND PRECARIOUS WORK, POLITICAL POWER AND SOCIAL THEORY
121 (Rina Agarwala & Jennifer Jihye Chun eds., vol. 3 2019); see also Eileen Boris & P. Nadasen,
Domestic Workers Organize!, 11 WORKINGUSA: J. LAB. & SOC’Y 413 (2008).
DOMESTIC
WORKERS
ALLIANCE,
http://domesticworkers.org
17. See
NATIONAL
[https://perma.cc/PS7F-2848] (last visited Jan. 7, 2020) (describing the goals and successes of the
NDWA); NDWA LABS, http://ndwalabs.org [https://perma.cc/RAM3-GK6A] (last visited Jan. 7, 2020)
(developing new approaches to improving labor standards in domestic work); MY ALIA,
http://myalia.org [https://perma.cc/4WPL-WUH7] (last visited Jan. 7, 2020) (online platform to provide
portable benefits).
18. Hina Shah, Notes from the Field: The Role of the Lawyer in Grassroots Policy Advocacy, 21
CLIN. L. REV. 393, 403 (2019); Ashar & Fisk, supra note 6.
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The emergence of local, regional, and nationwide organizations of
domestic workers and day laborers that exercise real power is, scholars
have said, “unexpected.” 15 The work has been regarded as informal, at
most, and even as not work at all. It is decentralized and isolated in private
residences, invisible to the public, poorly paid, and dominated by immigrant people of color who often have no legal status in the United States.
That these organizations have succeeded in enacting minimum labor standards laws and in fending off legal attacks on their members is astonishing.
A threshold challenge in domestic worker organizing was convincing
policymakers that domestic work is labor, not “help,” and that as labor it is
worthy of legal protection. Although domestic worker organizations
formed before the 1960s both as worker-led unions and as elite or middleclass feminist-led nonprofit associations, 16 the last decade or more of organizing has been an immigrant female worker-led campaign spearheaded
by the sixty-plus local organizations that have affiliated to become the National Domestic Worker Alliance (NDWA). NDWA, through its affiliates
in more than thirty cities, has secured the enactment of domestic worker
bills of rights in ten jurisdictions, and is developing online platforms to
facilitate the hiring of in-home care and cleaning workers and to provide
portable benefits for workers.17
Contemporary domestic worker organizations came out of the local
immigrant community organizations.18 The campaign’s law reform goal
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19. See generally NATIONAL DOMESTIC WORKERS ALLIANCE, supra note 17.
20. Ashar & Fisk, supra note 6, at 167.
21. Shah, supra note 18, at 394.
22. Terri Nilliasca, Some Women’s Work: Domestic Work, Class, Race, Heteropatriarchy, and
the Limits of Legal Reform, 16 MICH. J. RACE & L. 377, 409 (2011).
23. See, e.g., Nik Theodore, Rebuilding the House of Labor: Unions and Worker Centers in the
Residential Construction Industry, 18 WORKINGUSA: J. LAB. & SOC’Y 59 (2015).
24. Sarmiento et al., supra note 15, at 141.
25. Id. at 142.
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has been to secure enactment of federal or state domestic worker bills of
rights and to get administrative action interpreting existing wage and hour
laws to cover domestic workers.19 More important than law reform, however, has been its goal of empowering domestic workers. 20 Both the social
agenda and the legal agenda have involved building worker-led organizations, but the goal has not been collective bargaining that federal labor law
envisions as the goal of worker organizing. The major recent legislative
wins have been the enactment of bills of rights in New York, Hawaii, and
California, and an Obama Administration Department of Labor determination that extended minimum wage protections to home care workers. 21 And
yet some criticize the process and results of these legislative campaigns,
arguing that the legislation still excludes too many workers, “does little to
change the actual conditions of domestic workers, while at the same time
lending credibility to the legislative and legal regime.”22
Day labor organizations take a variety of forms. Scholars have distinguished between worker centers that educate and organize day laborers
(among many other workers) in legislative, judicial, and policy advocacy,
and day labor centers which serve primarily to match day laborers with
employers. 23 Organizations of domestic workers and day laborers have
three different levels: the very local (perhaps even neighborhood), the city
or regional, and the national, which is typically a federation of local organizations.24 They affiliate with other organizations, including unions and
NGOs. They operate as labor intermediaries that regularize and make jobs
transparent to both job-seekers and employers, and offer work-related training and other services to upgrade the skills of the workforce. They act like
unions in seeking to raise wages and improve safety and other working
conditions by organizing and advocating (although not typically by bargaining directly with employers in a formalized way), and by conducting
public protests when necessary. And they act like community organizations
in engaging and educating workers over a range of political and social issues, including politics, immigration, and leadership development. 25
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B. Food Service
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26. See JAYARAMAN, supra note 6; Andrew Elmore, Franchise Regulation for the Fissured
Economy, 88 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 101 (2018).
27. Our Work, RESTAURANT OPPORTUNITIES CTRS. UNITED, https://rocunited.org/mission/
[https://perma.cc/M5VH-2L5Z] (last visited Mar. 24, 2020).
28. Id.
29. This is not to overlook the significant organizing that has occurred in food production and
distribution. And, indeed, the Coalition of Immokalee Workers’ Fair Food Program, which is based on
supply chain contracts that ensure that a tiny price increase paid by consumers is passed down through
the many levels of contracts to result in higher pay for Florida farmworkers who tend and harvest
tomatoes, has achieved remarkable durability in the production and distribution, but it has not yet grown
to encompass the food supply chain generally. FAIR FOOD PROGRAM, http://www.fairfoodprogram.org.
30. See Dorothy Benz, Labor’s Ace in the Hole: Casino Organizing in Law Vegas, 26 NEW POL.
SCI. 525, 526 (2004) (stating that, at the time of the study, union density in Las Vegas was 65% and
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Organizing focused on low-wage work has concentrated on food service, as it is an area of extremely low wages (in many states, the hourly
minimum wage is the federal subminimum wage of $2.13 for tipped employees), rampant noncompliance with minimum labor standards, and sexual harassment. 26 Organizing in food service has taken many forms over
the last decade; most illustrate core aspects of the Alt-Labor models.
The organizing is multifaceted, multi-institutional, and sectoral. And,
importantly for purposes of considering sustainability, it aims to link policy
or legislative campaigns to the formation of organizations that will last
beyond a legislative win. ROC United’s strategy is illustrative. Its approach
is “rooted in people” and works by engaging restaurant workers, high road
employers, and consumers in campaigns and organizations simultaneously. 27 ROC engages workers through job training and placement (it has restaurants and a job training program) and through civic engagement and
leadership development by involving workers in its One Fair Wage campaigns in various states to eliminate the subminimum wage for tipped employees. It engages employers through its employer association, RAISE,
which provides training, technical assistance, and a peer network. And it
engages consumers through Diners United, a “conscious consumer association.” 28
Other organizations too are organizing or have organized in food service. The Fight for 15 campaign scored huge successes in raising the minimum wage in many states to $15 per hour and in challenging legal
structures that allow franchisors to disclaim any liability for labor violations in restaurants operated by franchisees. 29
The Culinary Workers Union Local 226 in Las Vegas has achieved a
level of sustainability that has yet to be achieved by worker formations
elsewhere in food service in the contemporary moment. 30 Part of its success
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and sustainability comes from its provision of benefits on a sectoral basis,
but its real power comes from organizing and representing workers at each
and all of the major enterprises in the Las Vegas hospitality and gaming
industry. 31
C. Misclassification
A third type of campaign has been to end misclassification of workers
as independent contractors. The campaign in California got a kickstart in
May 2018 when the California Supreme Court decided, unanimously, that a
logistics company called Dynamex was the employer of its drivers.32 The
Court’s adoption of the employee-protective ABC test in place of the more
easily evaded multi-factor test under California wage and hour law did not
immediately change working conditions for the tens of thousands of Uber,
Lyft, or Door Dash drivers, Amazon delivery people, or other misclassified
workers, as companies seemed to ignore it. 33 Thus, Dynamex looked like
the litigation that resulted in Brown v. Board of Education. But the story
did not stop there. Building on that litigation victory, organized labor
groups in California, with nationwide support, supported legislation (Assembly Bill 5) to extend the Dynamex ABC rule to all provisions of the
California labor code.34
Neither Dynamex nor AB 5 has yet to have any major effect on the
working conditions of app-based ride hailing drivers, as Uber’s general
counsel publicly announced the company has no intention of complying
with the law when it went into effect on January 1, 2020. 35 It appears that
42394-ckt_95-1 Sheet No. 12 Side A
06/12/2020 13:18:38

90% on the Strip at a time when private sector union density nationwide was about 8%); Courtney
Alexander, Rise to Power: The Recent History of the Culinary Union in Law Vegas, in THE GRIT
BENEATH THE GLITTER: TALES FROM THE REAL LAS VEGAS 145–46 (Hal K. Rothman & Mike Davis
eds., 2002) (describing the success of the Culinary Workers Local 226).
31. See Matthew Ginsburg, Nothing New Under the Sun: “The New Labor Law” Must Still
grapple with the Traditional Challenges of Firm-Based Organizing and Building Self-Sustainable
Worker Organizations, 126 YALE L.J. F. 488, 490 (2017) (arguing that “[t]here is simply no way to
rebuild the labor movement at scale without facing [the] challenge” of organizing workers at each
enterprise where they work).
32. Dynamex Operations West v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 5th 903, 966–67 (2018).
33. Levi Sumagaysay, Uber Defiant as Gig Workers on Verge of Becoming Employees Under AB
5, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (Sept. 11, 2019), https://www.mercurynews.com/author/levi-sumagaysay/
[https://perma.cc/U7EU-3ZWN].
34. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2750.3 (WEST 2019); AB-5 Worker status: employees and independent
contractors,
CAL.
LEGIS.
INFO.
(Sept.
19,
2019,
4:00
AM),
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201920200AB5
[https://perma.cc/E6KS-3TNW].
35. See supra note 34; Shirin Ghaffary, Uber and Lyft Say They Don’t Plan to Reclassify Their
Drivers
and
Employees,
VOX
(Sept.
11,
2019,
6:50
PM),
https://www.vox.com/2019/9/11/20861599/ab-5-uber-lyft-drivers-contractors-reclassify-employees
[https://perma.cc/LQL4-FWAX].
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neither Uber nor any of the other app-based service companies (Lyft, Task
Rabbit, DoorDash, etc.) have altered their labor practices, even though
California law has required them to pay the minimum wage since May
2018, when the state supreme court handed down Dynamex.
When the California governor signed AB 5 into law in September
2019, worker organizing entered a new part of the path to end misclassification because they secured a broad and decisive legal victory. But the
legal fight is not over. Uber, Lyft, and Door Dash announced they are funding an effort to repeal AB 5 and overturn Dynamex by ballot initiative, and
various industry groups sued to invalidate it. 36
The legal fight may be long, perhaps endless. 37 Meanwhile, the struggle is to translate a legal win into a changed reality on the ground. That
raises a question of institutionalization—how does a legal reform become
institutionalized in such a way that it changes the law in action as well as
the law on the books? It also raises a question of sustainability—if the history of the New Deal is that capitalists will seek to erode labor gains as
soon as they are written into law and that eternal vigilance on labor’s part is
the price of equality (to paraphrase), unions have the most to contribute to
the question of sustainability of an equitable political economy.
II. DECLINE AND REVIVAL AFTER THE LEGISLATIVE WIN

06/12/2020 13:18:38

36. Kate Conger, Uber, Lyft, and DoorDash Pledge $90 Million to Fight Driver Legislation in
California, N.Y. TIMES, (Aug. 28, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/29/technology/uber-lyftballot-initiative.html [https://perma.cc/Z35B-SD97]; Scott Rodd, Uber, Lyft, Postmates Refuse to
Comply with California Gig Economy Law, NPR (Jan. 4, 2020, 6:01 AM),
https://www.npr.org/2020/01/04/793142903/as-california-tries-to-make-contract-workers-employeesindustries-push-back [https://perma.cc/8WH5-5CDJ].
37. Janet Burns, Will Uber and Lyft Ever Stop Fighting Laws, Or Their Workers?, FORBES (Nov.
8, 2019, 11:22 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/janetwburns/2019/11/08/will-platforms-like-uberand-lyft-ever-stop-fighting-the-law-or-their-workers/#7be4e4407bd7 [https://perma.cc/RYH6-X5B2].
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The heady days after the legislative wins of domestic worker bills of
rights, local minimum wage increases, and AB 5 have prompted some who
have been around the world of labor to recall the story of the California
Agricultural Labor Relations Act and the tragic story of the United Farm
Workers (UFW). How can labor ensure that the activism that produces
these legislative successes will translate into sustainable and scalable improvements in working conditions and gains in worker power?
Alt-Labor organizations today, like the UFW, are fundamentally sectoral, not enterprise-based. They focus on enacting and enforcing minimum
standards legislation in low wage sectors, not enterprises (the grape fields
and strawberry fields, restaurant, domestic work, day labor, app-based gig

42394-ckt_95-1 Sheet No. 13 Side A

06/12/2020 13:18:38

2 FISK MACRO 1 EIC 5.4 (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

SUSTAINABLE ALT-LABOR

5/8/2020 10:27 PM

17

06/12/2020 13:18:38

38. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1140 (WEST 1995)
39. See generally MIRIAM PAWEL, THE CRUSADES OF CESAR CHAVEZ (2014); MIRIAM PAWEL,
THE UNION OF THEIR DREAMS: POWER, HOPE, AND STRUGGLE IN CESAR CHAVEZ’S FARM WORKER
MOVEMENT (2009) [hereinafter PAWEL, THE UNION OF THEIR DREAMS]; FRANK BARDACKE,
TRAMPLING OUT THE VINTAGE: CESAR CHAVEZ AND THE TWO SOULS OF THE UNITED FARM WORKERS
(2011).
40. PAWEL, THE UNION OF THEIR DREAMS, supra note 39, at 206.
41. Id. at 317.
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work, etc.). They rely on mobilizing workers in campaigns to publicize,
stop, and remedy labor standards violations in sectors, and on campaigns to
seek legislative or other legal change. Their goal is to use these protosectoral forms of representation and law to end social exclusion. This is
quite different from the nature of organizations envisioned by federal labor
law.
The problem is what happens after the campaign ends. Enduring
worker power requires some form of institutionalization. Unions used to
achieve that through enterprise-based collective bargaining and, occasionally, sectoral multi-employer bargaining or established pattern bargaining
relationships. But in the more flexible and fissured labor market of today
and the future, it is necessary to develop other structures.
Consider what happened to a labor movement success (the United
Farm Workers) that failed to achieve institutional sustainability as a labor
organization and a labor organization that gained and expanded power
through movement activism (teachers’ unions). Both of these are long and
complicated stories that I sketch only briefly. And it is fair to say that significant controversy swirls around both the decline of the UFW and the
evolution and strategy of teachers’ unions. The point of these sketches is to
gesture toward the interdependence of movement activism and institutional
power in sustaining labor power in the modern economy.
After nearly twenty years of intense and creative organizing, the UFW
secured the enactment of the California Agricultural Labor Relations Act
(ALRA), 38 which protects farmworkers’ right to unionize, and they used
the power of the law to win recognition and contracts from some of the
major growers across the state. 39 But both before and after the ALRA went
into effect in 1975, the UFW won elections and negotiated contracts for
farmworkers up and down the state. 40
But the power and the contracts did not last. For good or bad reasons,
in the late 1970s and through the 1980s, the UFW focused more on personal transformation of its staff and on building Latinx political power and less
on organizing farmworkers for collective bargaining or direct improvement
working conditions.41 A decade before Cesar Chavez died in 1993, the
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42. In 2019, the ALRB issued eight decisions. In the first four months of 2020, it issued one. In
contrast, in 1975 (its first year of operation), it issued 27 decisions and in 1976 it issued 63. See Case
Decision Index, AGRIC. LAB. REL. BOARD, https://www.alrb.ca.gov/legal-searches/decision-index/
[https://perma.cc/3RWA-ENSP] for an annual index of ALRB decisions.
43. See, e.g., Campaign News, UNITED FARM WORKERS, https://ufw.org/campaign-news/
[https://perma.cc/W82K-Y9B3] (last visited Dec. 6, 2019) (reporting legislative campaigns and no
bargaining campaigns).
44. See generally MARSHALL GANZ, WHY DAVID SOMETIMES WINS (2009).
45. Michael M. Oswalt, Alt-Bargaining, 82 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89 (2019).
46. Id.
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union had few members and even fewer contracts imposing minimum labor
standards and wages, and working conditions were as bad as ever. Although the ALRA remains on the books and the California Agricultural
Labor Relations Board still exists, it is an empty shell.42 Although the UFW
claims just over 10,000 members, its strategies focus more on legislation to
protect workers than on collective bargaining.43 While the story of how the
UFW collapsed in the late 1970s and 1980s has been told and many causes
contributed, one factor all can agree upon is the failure to transform effectively from a social justice campaign to a union, and a failure to continue
the work of being a movement that engages workers in self-governance. It
remains unclear why it has yet to achieve a revival.
The moral of the UFW story is that enacting protective labor law and
creating an accessible enforcement framework to protect unions as collective bargaining entities are not by themselves enough to protect labor. A
certain amount of movement activism is necessary to prevent the power of
capitalists from crushing labor, and a certain amount of institutional leverage is necessary to provide the economic, political, social, and psychological resources to sustain the movement. 44
In contrast, the upsurge of activism of teachers since the Chicago
teachers’ strike of 2012, and especially the Red for Ed movements that
sprang into the news in April 2018, show that the revival of movement
activism can be greatly facilitated by the institutional power and resources
of labor unions, even where there is no legal right to bargain and, therefore,
a relatively weak union. 45 As Michael Oswalt and others have observed,
recent teachers’ strikes, and the dramatic change in the goals and tactics of
teachers—bargaining for the common good, focusing on taxation and disinvestment in education—are classic examples of Alt-Labor goals and tactics. Whether the union is leading from the front, as in Chicago, Minnesota,
and California, or from behind, as in West Virginia and red states in spring
2018, the resources of a union helps with publicity, media relations, and
organizing. 46 And bargaining relationships help protect against a quick
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rollback of the strike’s gains once the TV cameras and social media fueled
awareness fades. 47
III. SUSTAINABLE ORGANIZATIONS AND PROTO-SECTORAL
BARGAINING
Scholars and activists have explored a variety of legal frameworks and
organizational forms that will enable effective regulation and sustainable
worker empowerment.48 I discuss two reforms that can be implemented at a
very local level, at a state level, or through federal legislation—coenforcement and hiring halls.
A. Co-Enforcement

06/12/2020 13:18:38

47. See Dana Goldstein, West Virginia Teachers Walk Out (Again) and Score a Win in Hours,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/19/us/teachers-strikes.html
[https://perma.cc/VAT9-38JG] (teachers struck twice in a year to block legislation that would reduce
public school funding).
48. Among them are sectoral bargaining, the Ghent system, wage boards, and tripartism. See NO
ONE SIZE FITS ALL: WORKER ORGANIZATION, POLICY AND MOVEMENT FOR A NEW ECONOMIC AGE
(Janice Fine et al. eds., LERA Research Volume series, 2018); Kati Griffith & Leslie Gates, Worker
Centers: Labor Law as Carrot, Not a Stick, 14 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. (forthcoming 2019); Kate
Andrias & Benjamin Sachs (forthcoming 2019); Matthew Dimick, Labor Law, New Governance, and
the Ghent System, 90 N.C. L. REV. 319 (2012).
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State and local labor standards agencies in California have been experimenting with collaborations with worker centers and other community
groups as part of their enforcement efforts. The goal of these coenforcement programs is to improve compliance and enforcement by training workers and community groups in the law and using their networks and
cultural and linguistic competence, along with their years of base-building
and member organizing, to improve outreach to marginalized workers and
increase worker awareness of their legal rights. Likewise, co-enforcement
increases the effectiveness of enforcement officials by educating them
about the problems faced by low-wage workers and the myriad ways in
which employers avoid compliance. Co-enforcement also supports organizing and builds sustainable organizations by providing a formal role for
worker and community groups in administering the law. Co-enforcement
initiatives in the San Francisco Office of Labor Standards Enforcement
(OLSE) and the California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement
(DLSE) have not only improved compliance and enforcement and enhanced the professional development, sophistication, and commitment of
enforcement officials, they have modestly strengthened the finances of
community groups, enhanced their legitimacy, and given low-wage work-
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ers most vulnerable to wage theft and other substandard working conditions
a role in governance. 49
There has long been a consensus in the literature that involvement of a
worker group (usually a union) improves labor law compliance and enforcement. 50 Formal involvement of a worker representative in enforcement also creates an institutional role for a labor organization by
legitimizing the organization in the eyes of workers, which is especially
important either when employer opposition to the organization is vociferous and intense or when worker ignorance of the benefits of organizational
affiliation makes it difficult to recruit committed and dues-paying members. In a seminal article, Janice Fine and Jennifer Gordon proposed augmenting labor standards enforcement agencies by giving groups like unions
and worker centers a formal, ongoing role in enforcement. 51 Since then, the
growing literature on co-enforcement has documented its effect in improving compliance and enforcement, especially in economic sectors with substantial immigrant populations where labor standards violations are
endemic and difficult to eradicate. 52
California has significant experience with co-enforcement at both the
state and local level. 53 In San Francisco, which has laws requiring a higher
minimum wage, paid sick days, employer-provided health care, secure
scheduling for retail workers, paid parental leave, pay equity, lactation
accommodation, and more, the city Office of Labor Standards Enforcement
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49. See Ken Jacobs & Michael Reich, “When Do Mandates Work?,” in WHEN MANDATES
WORK: RAISING LABOR STANDARDS AT THE LOCAL LEVEL 35 (Michael Reich, Ken Jacobs & Miranda
Dietz eds., 2014).
50. See generally DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE: WHY WORK BECAME SO BAD FOR
SO MANY AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT (2014); Lawrence Mishel & Matthew Walters,
How Unions Help All Workers, ECON. POL. INST. 13 (2003), http://www.epi.org/files/page//old/briefingpapers/143/bp143.pdf [https://perma.cc/42GA-BZEC]; Alison D. Morantz, What Unions
Do for Regulation, 13 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 515, 520 (2017).
51. See generally Janice Fine & Jennifer Gordon, Strengthening Labor Standards Enforcement
through Partnerships with Workers’ Organizations, 38 POL. & SOC’Y 552 (2010).
52. See, e.g., Janice Fine, Enforcing Labor Standards in Partnership with Civil Society: Can Coenforcement Succeed Where the State Alone Has Failed? 45 POL. & SOC’Y 359, 359 (2017); Janice
Fine & Gregory Lyon, Segmentation and the Role of Labor Standards Enforcement in Immigration
Reform, 5 J. ON MIGRATION & HUM. SEC. 431, 431 (2017); Matthew Amengual & Janice Fine, CoEnforcing Labor Standards: The Unique Contributions of State and Worker Organizations in Argentina
and the United States, 11 REG. & GOVERNANCE 129, 129 (2017); DAVID MADLAND, THE FUTURE OF
WORKER VOICE AND POWER, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (2016); DAVID MADLAND & ALEX ROWELL,
HOW STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS CAN STRENGTHEN WORKER POWER AND RAISE WAGES, CTR.
FOR AM. PROGRESS (2017); NAT’L EMP’T L. PROJECT, WINNING WAGE JUSTICE: AN ADVOCATE’S
GUIDE TO STATE AND CITY POLICIES TO FIGHT WAGE THEFT (Jan. 2011).
53. Tia Koonse et al., Enforcing City Minimum Wage Laws in California: Best Practices and
City-State Partnerships, UCLA CTR. LAB. RES. & EDUC., U.C. BERKELEY CTR. LAB. RES. & EDUC.
(Oct. 23, 2015), http://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/pdf/2015/minimum-wage-enforcement.pdf.
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(OLSE) has partnered with a number of community organizations in enforcing the municipal labor standards laws.
Co-enforcement in San Francisco originated in its minimum wage ordinance, as amended in 2006, which requires that OLSE “establish a community-based outreach program to conduct education and outreach to [San
Francisco] employees.” 54 As the program evolved over time, OLSE sought
partnerships with groups that could provide “education and outreach to
workers in immigrant communities with limited English proficiency . . . in
as many of the languages spoken by employees in San Francisco as possible.” 55 One goal, OLSE explained, was “creating conditions in which these
workers are more likely to report labor law violations.” 56 OLSE structured
co-enforcement in a series of multi-year contracts to provide sustained
investment in community organizations that sought to build worker power. 57
The Chinese Progressive Association (CPA), which had a long experience organizing in San Francisco’s low-wage and immigrant communities,
became the prime contractor with the city on the co-enforcement initiative. 58 CPA had prevailed in several discrete high-profile wage theft recovery cases, 59 but wage theft remained rampant.”60 To reach beyond CPA’s
own cultural, linguistic, and sectoral network, CPA subcontracted with
seven other community partners in the monolingual Spanish-speaking
community, the Filipino community, a number of Asian communities, a
multi-racial and bilingual membership organization of young and immigrant workers, and a local chapter of the National Day Laborers Organizing
Network (NDLON). 61 Quarterly meetings of OLSE and community partner
42394-ckt_95-1 Sheet No. 15 Side A
06/12/2020 13:18:38

54. S.F. Admin. Code § 12R.25.
55. Seema N. Patel & Catherine L. Fisk, California Co-Enforcement Initiatives that Facilitate
Worker Organizing, HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 7 (2018), https://harvardlpr.com/wpcontent/uploads/sites/20/2017/11/Patel-Fisk-CoEnforcement.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G2EM-PAL9]
(citation omitted).
56. Id. at 7–8 (emphasis in original).
57. Id. at 13.
58. Mission and History, Chinese Progressive ASS’N., http://www.cpasf.org/mission
[https://perma.cc/37FR-PDGM] (last visited Nov. 15, 2019).
59. CPA won $525,000 in back pay and penalties for workers at Dick Lee Pastry. News Release,
City Attorney of San Francisco, Wage theft lawsuit seeks to recover $440K in back pay, interest for
cheated workers (July 12, 2011), https://www.sfcityattorney.org/2011/07/12/wage-theft-lawsuit-seeksto-recover-440k-in-back-pay-interest-for-cheated-workers/ [https://perma.cc/3DV2-SF3N]; Janice Fine,
Co-Production: Bringing Together the Unique Capabilities of Government and Society for Stronger
Labor Standards Enforcement, LAB. INNOVATIONS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY FUND 27 (Sept. 2015)
http://theliftfund.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/LIFTReportCoproductionOct_ExecSumm-rf_4.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q9GL-YW4X].
60. Patel & Fisk, supra note 55, at 7.
61. Fine, supra note 59, at 24.
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62. Patel & Fisk, supra note 55, at 13-14.
63. Id. at 13.
64. Id.
65. Twilight Greenway, SF Restaurant Yank Sing Workers Earn Historic $4 Million Settlement,
CIVIL EATS (Nov. 19, 2014), http://civileats.com/2014/11/19/sf-restaurant-yank-sing-workers-earnhistoric-4-million-settlement/ [https://perma.cc/46SU-8729].
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staff provided a forum for discussion of progress in enforcement activities,
for relationship-building, and for discussion of new developments in law or
policy.
Because co-enforcement is implemented by a government contract,
the relationship is governed by the exacting requirements of government
contracts, which required community organizations to provide objective
measures of enforcement success. But it requires creativity to figure out
how to measure the deliverables in access to justice and in building trust
among fearful low-wage immigrant workers. San Francisco phrased deliverables in terms of community partners having specific numbers and types
of contacts with low-wage workers in each partner’s linguistic or ethnic
community (Chinese, Filipino, Latino, Vietnamese, Middle Eastern, Muslim, and South Asian, and young workers). 62 The community contractors
were required to “resolve” or “refer” to OLSE, the California DLSE, or the
federal DOL a specified number of “labor law complaints” per quarter.63 A
specified number of worker consultations were required per year. Community partners were also required to speak to a specified number of workers
“directly and sharing linguistically and culturally appropriate information
on San Francisco and California labor laws,” and to “conduct workshops
designed to educate low-wage San Francisco workers on their rights under
local and state labor law.” 64
An early and significant co-enforcement success involved the workers
at an upscale San Francisco dim sum restaurant known as Yank Sing in
2013 and 2014. The community partners worked with the San Francisco
OLSE and the California DLSE to negotiate the largest monetary settlement either agency had achieved at that point in time ($4.25 million) for
nearly 300 workers.65 With the support of the nonprofit groups and city and
state agencies’ close scrutiny, the workers walked out during peak restaurant hours—an unusual display of concerted activity for a non-union workplace. The employees got the company to agree to provide meal and rest
breaks, paid sick days, wages that were higher than the local minimum
(including a 5% raise for non-tipped workers), holiday pay and vacation
pay, full health coverage for employees with no deductibles, and, because
most workers have family in China, the right to take up to four weeks of
approved time-off without risking their jobs. The settlement included im-
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66. Patel & Fisk, supra note 55, at 3.
67. The DLSE co-enforcement program is described in detail in Patel & Fisk, supra note 55, at 1,
and in Fine & Lyon, supra note 52, at 442. See also 2017–2018 Fiscal Year Report on the Effectiveness
of
the
Bureau
of
Field
Enforcement,
CAL.
LAB.
COMM’R
OFF.
(2018),
https://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/BOFE_LegReport2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/K4CN-5YWW] (describing
partnerships with community organizations).
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portant nonmonetary elements—an admission of guilt, an apology, and a
commitment by the employer to righting the wrongs going forward—that
sent a powerful message to both the worker community and industry players that organizing compels employers to comply with minimum standards
and to treat their workers with respect. For the community organizers, the
Yank Sing campaign represents the power of tying enforcement to organizing. 66
California has a state-wide co-enforcement program that is in many
ways similar to San Francisco’s. 67 Through a partnership among DLSE, its
Bureau of Field Enforcement (BOFE), the California affiliate of the National Employment Law Project, and local worker organizations, the state
has provided grants to several community organizations in San Francisco,
Los Angeles, and rural Ventura County to target sectors with endemic
wage theft. In the California program, as in San Francisco’s, each community organization is responsible for identifying cases and bringing them to
BOFE for enforcement action. BOFE and the community organization then
work together on every step of the case.
Unlike in San Francisco, which has OLSE in direct partnership with a
handful of community organizations and worker centers, at the state-wide
level, DLSE/BOFE partners with NELP and with community organizations. A NELP lawyer works with the community groups to identify wage
theft cases, which the community group then presents to BOFE. BOFE then
takes over prosecuting the case but relies on the community group for assistance with identifying witnesses, gathering documentary evidence about
wage practices, building trust among the workers (many of whom are undocumented and distrustful of government agencies), and ensuring that the
workers understand, participate in, benefit from, and are not retaliated
against because of the enforcement activity. The program has provided
annual retreats for BOFE staff and investigators to meet with worker activists to learn about labor practices in the low wage economy.
The DLSE co-enforcement program has some structural features that
give greater potential to support organizing than San Francisco’s model.
Co-enforcement at DLSE is funded as a pilot project by the Irvine Foundation. The private funding gives greater flexibility in how community groups
can integrate outreach on labor standards with other outreach that the
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community group does. In other words, the pursuit of numerically defined
deliverables need not be the primary driver of strategy. Lawyer-activists at
both OLSE and NELP explain that building worker power cannot easily be
quantified (especially without a dues model driving the organization), so
the foundation funding allows the number of cases referred or resolved, or
the number of trainings or worker meetings, to arise organically from organizing rather than organizing happening as a result of the pursuit of deliverables.
Co-enforcement helps build sustainable worker organizations because
it provides some funding, as well as legitimacy, and a direct connection to
enforcement agencies that are important, if not always strictly necessary,
for a worker group to have real power as an organization. This matters
enormously to worker centers and other groups that lack what made organized labor strong in its mid-twentieth century heyday: the dues model of
funding, the collective bargaining relationship that confers legitimacy, and
the budget to hire lobbyists and lawyers who will ensure a direct connection to government power. Co-enforcement also embeds a worker-oriented
commitment throughout a bureaucracy so that enforcement is less subject
to the vicissitudes of electoral politics. Co-enforcement grants help to sustain the base-building organizations on which legal compliance depends.
And the involvement of grassroots groups is the best insurance that the coenforcement ecosystem keeps the workers themselves involved.
B. Hiring Halls

06/12/2020 13:18:38

68. Model Rule of Disciplinary Conduct 5.4 provides, in part, that lawyers may not form a partnership with a nonlawyer if any of the activities of the partnership consist of the practice of law and
may not practice with or in the form of a for-profit entity if a nonlawyer owns any interest in the practice or is a director or officer of the entity. See Gillian Hadfield, The Cost of Law: Promoting Access to
Justice Through the (Un)Corporate Practice of Law, INT’L REV. L. & ECON. (2013) (advocating abandoning the Rule 5.4 restriction on the finance and governance of law firms).
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A second way in which law can facilitate the translation of mobilization into institutional power is to enable workers to form organizations that
give them a greater role in job matching and labor market coordination.
Law firms, hospitals, Uber, Care.com, and temp agencies are all institutions
that match workers with those in need of services. What distinguishes law
firms from all the rest is that law prohibits outside investors in law firms so
that the lawyers themselves (or a subset of them) control the institution.68
Why not use law to give other workers greater control over the institutions
in which they work – in other words, why not use law to expand the use of
hiring halls throughout the economy?
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69. An overview of the challenges in contemporary job searches described in this paragraph and
the role that unions and other worker formations could play in addressing them is David Rolf, A
Roadmap to Rebuilding Worker Power, THE CENTURY FOUND. (Aug. 9, 2018),
https://tcf.org/content/report/roadmap-rebuilding-worker-power/?session=1&agreed=1
[perma.cc/KV3C-YYK6].
70. See, e.g., Dorothy Sue Cobble, Organizing the Postindustrial Work Force: Lessons from the
History of Waitress Unionism, 44(3) ILR REV. 419, 433 (1991).
71. Unions have operated referral systems for which they have been permitted to charge fees to
nonunion workers without an actual physical hall, as by screening workers, compiling and maintaining
lists, contacting prospective workers, and reading names of eligible workers to employers over the
phone or from a space in the employer’s premises. See, e.g., Toledo World Terminals, 289 N.L.R.B.
670, 671-73 (1988); Plumbers Local Union No. 17, 224 N.L.R.B. 1262, enf’d, 575 F.2d 585, 586 (6th
Cir. 1978); Detroit Mailers Union No. 40, 192 N.L.R.B. 951, 965 (1971).
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Labor market coordination involves enormous effort and enormous
power for those who do it, especially in sectors in which people switch jobs
frequently or provide services to many different clients. Workers at all
levels of skill, education, and compensation face daunting challenges in
seeking new jobs. It takes time and effort to find, apply for, and interview
for open jobs. Employers and employees alike waste time and resources
seeking a match. Many employers demand more skills or credentials than
they’re willing to pay for and focus on credentials rather than on competency, which creates disparate impacts on the basis of race, gender or gender identity, disability, and background, including criminal records.69
Unscrupulous, low-road employment agencies have become the labor intermediaries in many industries. These agencies engage in wage theft,
charge exorbitant fees, prevent workers from using unemployment insurance or workers’ compensation, and do not provide health benefits, vacation or sick days, or retirement plans. The many tech-enabled job matching
services (Monster, Indeed, Glassdoor, Craigslist, or Care.com) that are
pathways to jobs have no accountability to workers, give workers no voice
in governance, and are strongly motivated to keep wages low and work
union-free. In the app-enabled gig economy, companies like Uber, Lyft,
Taskrabbit and Postmates have coordinated casual labor but eroded hardwon employment protections by misclassifying workers as independent
contractors while setting the price for their labor.
If workers had power in the job-matching process, they could establish
floors for wages and benefits, improve other workplace standards, create
cross-firm benefits programs, and, most broadly, create an occupational
identity of the sort that professionals enjoy. 70 Union hiring halls have long
played this role. A hiring hall—whether a physical space, such as a union
hall, office, or dock, or a “virtual” hall, 71 run through an online platform—
benefits employers and employees by facilitating job-matching, enables
job-training and skills certification, creates the infrastructure to administer

42394-ckt_95-1 Sheet No. 17 Side B

06/12/2020 13:18:38

2 FISK MACRO 1 EIC 5.4 (DO NOT DELETE)

26

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

5/8/2020 10:27 PM

[Vol 95:1

sectoral benefits programs, and supports the development of an occupational identity. Referral and service-providing hiring halls could be central
clearing houses where workers congregate and connect to resources and
services, including child care and organized leisure activities, all while
taking back from employment agencies control over work schedules. 72
Hiring halls can require both union members and nonmembers to adhere to reasonable, non-discriminatory rules that are designed to ensure the
hall’s effective operation. 73 Reasonable rules can include adherence to
rules regarding timeliness or reliability in reporting to work and adherence
to specific standards regarding pay and quality of work. 74
Historically, unions have sought hiring halls to be an exclusive arrangement in which an employer grants the union operating the hiring hall
the exclusive right to refer employees, and the employer cannot hire from
any other source. 75 Even Senator Taft, a principal author of the TaftHartley Act which restricted various union security devices, recognized
that “the union frequently is the best employment agency,” and union hiring halls benefit employers, employees, and the public by reducing wasted
effort in job-seeking, reducing corruption and favoritism in job-matching,
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72. The balance between leadership development, skills enhancement, and community organizing
of the worker organization is a matter of lively discussion among worker center leaders. See generally
Oswalt & Rosado-Marzán, supra note 8; Cesar F. Rosado Marzán, Worker Centers and the Moral
Economy: Disrupting Through Brokerage, Prestige, and Moral Framing, 2017 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 409
(2018); Rebecca J. Livengood, Organizing for Structural Change: The Potential and Promise of Worker Centers, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 325 (2013); Dorothy Sue Cobble, Lost Ways of Unionism:
Historical Perspectives on Reinventing the Labor Movement, in REKINDLING THE MOVEMENT:
LABOR’S QUEST FOR RELEVANCE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 82–96 (Lowell Turner, Harry C.
Katz and Richard W. Hurd eds., 2001); Jennifer Gordon, We Make the Road by Walking: Immigrant
Workers, the Workplace Project and the Struggle for Social Change Symposium: Economic Justice in
America’s Cities: Visions and Revisions of a Movement, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407 (1995).
73. Courts have consistently treated hiring halls as distinct from union security agreements generally and have recognized that nondiscriminatory exclusive hiring halls are not synonymous with closed
shops. They are not per se unlawful under the NLRA, and unions retain considerable discretion in
structuring their operations so long as they are not operated in a discriminatory fashion. Local 357 Int’l
Bhd. of Teamsters v. N.L.R.B., 365 U.S. 667, 673-74 (1961). Hiring halls are legal as long as all workers
are allowed to enroll in a hiring register regardless of union membership and are treated equally under
the rules established by the hiring hall for job placement.
74. In IATSE, Local 838 (Freeman Decorating), 364 N.L.R.B. No. 81 (2016), the Board ruled
that a union does not violate Section 8(b)(1)(A) by maintaining a hiring hall that required users to pay
fines to the union if they failed to report for work and permanently removed workers from the referral
list after a fourth attendance offense. The Board majority found that a rebuttable presumption of a
violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) arises when a union takes action that affects a referent’s employment
status for reasons other than the failure to pay dues or other fees uniformly required. However, the
union rebutted the presumption because its rule was reasonably designed to ensure effective operation
of its hiring hall by protecting its relationship with employers to which it supplied labor. This case
shows that hiring halls have discretion to establish and enforce norms and standards throughout an
industry.
75. See generally Pittsburgh Press Co. v. N.L.R.B., 977 F.2d 652 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (discussing the
history of legal regulation of hiring halls).
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and protecting workers who might otherwise be “at the mercy of petty
racketeers who demanded kick-backs” for job referrals.” 76 The NLRB has
long endorsed hiring halls because they “eliminate wasteful, timeconsuming and repetitive scouting for jobs by individual workers and haphazard uneconomical searches by employers.” 77
Exclusive hiring halls are almost always established by collective bargaining agreements and are prohibited by the NLRA’s ban on closed shops
only if the hiring hall refuses to refer non-union workers even if they are
willing to pay a reasonable fee tied to the pro rata cost of the operation of
the hiring hall.78 In nonexclusive arrangements, the union’s hiring hall is
only one of many possible sources of employees. In either case, under federal labor law, a union-run hiring hall cannot deny employees access on the
basis of union membership but can charge nonmembers a reasonable fee
tied to the pro rata cost of operating the hall. 79 Workers who want to join
the union would pay union dues, part of which would cover the hiring hall
referral fee.
Enabling unions and other labor organizations to operate nondiscriminatory exclusive hiring halls, even in states that bar union security
agreements, generates power for workers over their employment. Achieving this level of worker solidarity and control over labor supply affords the
hiring hall operator the bargaining leverage needed to improve significantly
the referred workers’ terms and conditions of employment. Non-exclusive
hiring hall arrangements, where a union or other entity is not the only supplier of labor to an employer, are also an option and would allow for a
members-only model. Such an arrangement, however, would not succeed
42394-ckt_95-1 Sheet No. 18 Side A
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76. SUBCOMM. ON LAB.-MGMT. REL. OF THE S. COMM. ON LAB. AND PUB. WELFARE, MARITIME
HIRING HALLS, S. REP. NO. 1827, at 6–7, 13 (81st Cong., 2d Sess. 1950) (additional views of Sen. Taft).
77. Mountain Pac. Chapter of Assoc. Gen. Contractors v. N.L.R.B., 119 N.L.R.B. 883, 896 n.8
(1958), enf. denied in par byt, 306 F.2d 34 (9th Cir. 1962), overruled in part by, Int’l Bhd. Teamsters,
Local 357 v. N.L.R.B., 365 U.S. 667 (1961).
78. See Local 357, Int’l Bd. of Teamsters v. N.L.R.B., 365 U.S. 667, 673-74 (1961); Radio
Officers’ Union v. N.L.R.B., 347 U.S. 17, 40-42 (1954).
79. Pittsburgh Press Co., 977 F.2d at 655. For example, Simms v. Local 1752, Int’l Longshoreman Ass’n, 838 F.3d 613 (5th Cir. 2016), rejected a legal challenge to an exclusive union hiring hall in
a suit brought by a nonmember in a right to work state. The nonmember who was denied referral for
employment because of his failure to pay the union a reasonable fee for use of the hiring hall alleged
that Mississippi’s right to work law prohibited the union’s assessment of mandatory fees for a nonunion
member for use of the hiring hall. The plaintiff’s theory was that hiring hall fees amount to compulsory
union membership, which states can prohibit under Section 14(b) of the NLRA. The court held that the
NLRA allows states to prohibit unions and employers to agree to conditions that come into effect after
an individual is hired, not to the hiring process itself. See Oil, Chem & Atomic Workers Int’l Union,
AFL-CIO v. Mobil Oil Corp., 426 US 407, 417 (1976) (holding that hiring hall fees do not compel
union membership); Pittsburgh Press Co. 977 F.2d at 657 (observing that “Congress, the Supreme
Court, and the NLRB . . . agreed on the basic principles of a legitimate hiring hall for which non-union
workers could be charged a fee by the union”).
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80. See For Members / Benefits, CULINARY WORKERS UNION LOCAL 226,
https://www.culinaryunion226.org/members/benefits [https://perma.cc/KH9S-M9F9] (last visited Jan.
7, 2020).
81. See MY ALIA, supra note 17.
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in improving labor standards unless the union represents a substantial majority in the sector and its members have uniquely valuable skills. Without
that, the hiring hall cannot effectively raise standards in the sector because
low-wage competition will remain a constant threat.
Hiring hall operators could offer, in addition to job placement, any
number of members-only services and benefits: training, health benefits,
retirement benefits, death benefits, funds for funeral expenses, financial
assistance during illness, loans from treasury after exhaustion of sick benefits, child care, free or low cost attorney services, free or low cost medical
care, unemployment insurance, workers’ compensation, no cost travel to
and from work, home loans, and help establishing bank accounts. The Culinary Union in Las Vegas is a good example of a union that provides excellent benefits to its hiring hall users.80 In fact, unions in Las Vegas,
operating in a state that bans union security agreements, have been able to
build substantial power, in part through the use of hiring halls. But the Culinary Union, and other successful instances of unions operating hiring
halls, all exist in a context where the union is also the exclusive bargaining
representative once the workers are hired. It is an open question as to how
effective a hiring hall would be if the employer does not also recognize the
union as the employees’ representative after they are hired.
The goals of labor unions, worker centers, and community-based
worker advocacy groups are sufficiently aligned such that they can be a
complement to one another, as opposed to being in competition with one
another, in the operation of a hiring hall. For example, worker centers’
deep connections to the communities they serve and awareness of the particular needs of their constituencies, and unions’ experiences in collective
bargaining and building political power, can reinforce each other and make
collaboration between them mutually beneficial. As noted above, the National Domestic Workers Alliance has already developed online platforms
to facilitate hiring in home care and cleaning workers and to provide portable benefits for workers. 81 Taking control of a labor supply in a local or
regional occupational market requires members, allied organizations, and
others to support or engage in collective actions to overcome employer and
establishment opposition.
Hiring halls of today must not be limited to serving only those who
qualify as statutory employees. Rather, those not covered under the NLRB
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(independent contractors, low-level supervisors, agricultural workers, and
domestic workers) can and should be included. 82 Focusing on the best
practices from the traditions of community and labor organizing can help to
build effective hiring halls, including a unionism with fluid, porous membership boundaries that shift as the nature of work shifts, and structural
capacity to organize occupationally and geographically as well as industrially. In addition, hiring halls that are run by worker organizations can provide a structure in which all levels—national, local, state, and regional—
are activated and empowered economically as well as politically.83
A hiring hall could be created by statute in the contemporary appbased gig economy by incentivizing co-op based employment as a source
of labor supply for platform companies such as Uber. It could gain political
traction if agreeing to source labor through a worker-controlled co-op were
a condition of an exemption from certain minimum labor standards laws
like California’s AB 5. That is, a worker co-operative system could give
workers control over job-matching regardless of whether the workers are
employees or independent contractors. But if the workers were independent
contractors, the platform company would be relieved of responsibility for
compliance with minimum labor standards laws, and the co-operatives
would negotiate the price of labor with the company and would administer
benefits systems. The idea would be that workers hired through a licensed
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82. Gonos and Martino provide a comprehensive strategy for such temp workers that transcends
production. It includes: (1) forming regional temp workers’ associations and creating work councils
which serve as organizing committees that build broader community coalitions; (2) building coalitions
to engage communities in statewide actions in order to generate widespread condemnation of abusive
temp agency practices and to disrupt supply of labor to and from them; (3) launching a hiring hall
operation inside a targeted high road employment agency and dividing up responsibilities; (4) creating
responsible employer pacts signed with these partner agencies/employers; (5) forming partnerships
where unions organize those workers falling under the NLRA and worker centers/community based
organizations work with the rest; (6) coordinating efforts at targeted facilities so that certain employers
are persuaded to use the hiring hall to meet their flexible labor needs and to voluntarily recognize the
union; (7) ensuring that CBAs negotiated by unions would spell out temp workers’ terms and conditions
and would regulate temp usage (8) creating multi-employer associations between unions/worker centers
and temp agencies/employers that sets a minimum living wage and guarantee of minimum number of
paid daily hours for a dispatched worker. See George Gonos & Carmen Martino, Temp Agency Workers
in New Jersey’s Logistics Hub: The Case for a Union Hiring Hall, 14 WORKINGUSA: J. LAB. & SOC’Y
499 (2011).
83. Occupational unionism is characterized by four overlapping categories: occupational identity,
control over the labor supply in the occupation, rights and benefits as a function of occupational membership rather than worksite affiliation, and peer control over performance standards and workplace
discipline. It was similar to craft unionism with emphasis on craft specialization, restrictive membership
rules and union monitoring of performance standards, but also had characteristics common with organizations formed by non-factory (skilled and unskilled) workers (longshoremen, agricultural, building
tradesmen, musicians, teamsters) in that it stressed employment security rather than job rights at a
particular facility (work sharing principles in downswings) and offered portable benefits (health and
welfare funds bound members emotionally as well as financially to the locals and its members). See
Cobble, supra note 70, at 419.
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labor cooperative with democratic worker control (where the licensing
requirement would ensure that workers actually control the co-op) would
be exempt from specified statutory minimum standards, thus giving platform companies an incentive to hire them and relieving them of responsibility for compliance with complex labor laws. Legislation could ensure
that co-ops were worker controlled by creating a nonprofit mutual benefit
corporation to be the federation of labor co-ops (and which could negotiate
on a sectoral basis over minimum terms) and would partner with the state
department of labor to ensure that the co-ops were democratically governed
by the workers. The basic principles of such a system would be the following:
1. open and voluntary membership, which would include uniform
hiring criteria for applicant workers and uniform membership
criteria for co-op worker owners;
2. worker ownership of the co-op, including a right of distribution
of net income to the worker owners; and
3. worker control of the co-op and the federation on a one-person,
one-vote basis.

See Theodore, supra note 23, at 59.
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84.
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Hiring halls or worker co-ops could be a partnership of unions and
worker centers. For example, a collaboration between the National Day
Laborer Organizing Network, LIUNA, and the AFL-CIO shows that day
labor worker centers can be strong union allies and key players in the current labor movement. Worker centers are effective mechanisms for organizing workers, monitoring industry conditions, and strengthening worker
protections. On the demand side, they increase transparency of the hiring
hall process and provide a means by which to hold employers accountable
for maintaining labor standards, while on the supply side they provide the
day laborers, monitor work quality, and provide opportunities for worker
incorporation into the mainstream economy through job search and assistance. 84
Hiring halls could be the base from which sectoral representation
could grow. Individuals from an ethnic neighborhood or an occupational
community could become members of a union or a worker organization.
The members would elect a group from among their ranks that would help
the organization to develop the hiring hall rules and administer the operations. The organization would train interested members in negotiation and

42394-ckt_95-1 Sheet No. 20 Side A

06/12/2020 13:18:38

2 FISK MACRO 1 EIC 5.4 (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

SUSTAINABLE ALT-LABOR

5/8/2020 10:27 PM

31

42394-ckt_95-1 Sheet No. 20 Side A
06/12/2020 13:18:38

public speaking, trade skills, and operational administration, and would
educate them about wages, benefits, and labor standards in relevant sectors,
regionally and more broadly, as well as in federal, state, and local labor and
employment statutes.
These workers would be primed to act effectively on works councils at
their specific workplace. They would also be trained to participate in wage
or standards board discussions with local government officials, union and
employer representatives and others in their community in a coenforcement or sectoral bargaining scenario. This would also pave the way
for union representation at the worksite, whether exclusive representation
or minority graduated representation, as the hiring hall organization would
have built a productive and supportive relationship with the referred workers.
Community-based organizations that operate high-road hiring halls
can develop strong ties of trust and loyalty to a community, which
strengthens their role in sector-specific, multi-community organizing.
Whether or not the organization is a labor union, it could partner with unions or national organizations with significant experience and infrastructure
around workplace and political action. This includes political action outside of the workplace as well as direct economic intervention within the
workplace, and both are mutually reinforcing as the group cohesion needed
to enforce direct action can also translate into a united voice at the polls.
Direct action in which unions are well-versed, such as civil disobedience,
boycotts, picketing, flash mobs, and strikes, is necessary if a communitybased hiring hall is to compete with low road employment agencies in order to disrupt the supply of labor from these agencies. Further, in partnering with a union, they gain experience in building worker power in the
industry, turning control of the labor market into bargaining strength, and
establishing formal relationships with employers.
A number of legal and policy reforms are necessary to create hiring
halls on a widespread basis. The nature of the legal reforms may depend on
the entity that operates the hiring hall and the structure of the sector in
which it operates.
For sectors that are structured like construction, in which many small
business employers hire workers on a short-term basis, unions have long
operated hiring halls to aid the rapid matching of skilled labor to the episodic needs of construction contractors. The construction trades unions
negotiate collective bargaining agreements with contractors before the labor force is hired for any particular job so that the contractor can gain access to the union hiring hall. Section 8(f) of the NLRA allows these pre-

42394-ckt_95-1 Sheet No. 20 Side B

06/12/2020 13:18:38

2 FISK MACRO 1 EIC 5.4 (DO NOT DELETE)

32

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

5/8/2020 10:27 PM

[Vol 95:1

06/12/2020 13:18:38

85. See supra text accompanying notes 74-80.
86. See Brown v. Prof’l Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996); F.T.C. v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990).
87. See Marshall Steinbaum, Antitrust, the Gig Economy, and Labor Market Power, 82 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 45 (2019).
88. See Sanjukta Paul, Fissuring and the Firm Exemption, 82 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 65 (2019).
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hire agreements. Expanding lawfulness of pre-hire agreements to nonconstruction industries with similar high-velocity labor markets would
allow hiring halls to expand beyond construction. This could be important
in agriculture and other seasonal work.
In other industries in which the demand for labor fluctuates slightly
but the employer base is stable, as in longshore work, the hiring hall operated like a day labor market. On the west coast, the International Longshore
and Warehouse Union ended the abuses of the day labor market by negotiating with all the west coast stevedoring companies to hire longshoremen
only from the ILWU hiring hall. Although the advent of containerized
shipping eliminated the day labor aspect of longshore work (and dramatically reduced employment), the hiring hall still operates as a way to place
skill union labor in available positions. The ILWU originally had closedshop agreements with the stevedoring companies that required them to hire
only from the ILWU hiring hall and required workers to participate in a
hiring hall in order to gain employment. So long as access to union or
worker organization membership is open to all (as it was with the ILWU),
there would be no legal obstacle to a closed-shop agreement. 85
Law should rationalize the circumstances in which group action setting the minimum terms of labor is lawful and when it is an antitrust violation. Unionized hiring hall relationships allow employers and workers,
acting collectively through their union, to agree on the price and terms of
labor. This raises no antitrust issue because of the labor exemption to antitrust. 86 Today, Uber, Lyft, Door Dash and other app-based service providers unilaterally set the price and terms of labor. This, the companies argue,
raises no antitrust issue because the price coordination happens within the
boundary of the firm. 87 Critics disagree.88 And when a labor contractor
agrees to supply labor at a set price and then refuses to negotiate with the
workers over a wage, that, too, should be seen to raise antitrust issues,
though it has not to date. Under current law, however, a worker-operated
hiring hall that is not the product of a collective bargaining agreement
would probably, at least by business, be thought to raise an antitrust problem to the extent it involves workers as a group agreeing to set a minimum
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89. See Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. at 411; Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v.
United States, 435 U.S. 679, 696 (1978) (holding professional organization’s ethics rule prohibiting
members from bidding against each other as to minimum fee violates antitrust law); Goldfarb v. Va.
State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 793 (1975) (holding minimum fee schedule adopted by lawyers violated
antitrust law).
90. Sanjukta Paul, Antitrust as Allocator of Coordination Rights, 67 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming
2020); Marshall Steinbaum, Antitrust, the Gig Economy, and Labor Market Power, 82 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 45 (2019).
91. First Nat’l Maint. Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 452 U.S. 666 (1981) (holding that janitorial services
contractor had no duty to bargain with union representing its employees over the contractor’s decision
to terminate service at a location which would result in layoff of janitors working at that location).
92. See supra text accompanying notes 86-87.
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price for their labor. 89 There is no reason why only firms or collective bargaining agreements, and not worker groups, can set the price of services or
otherwise coordinate the labor market.90 But if courts were to conclude it
does, then a change in antitrust law would be necessary to expand the hiring hall framework.
Law should also facilitate negotiation between employers and labor
organizations to address the fissurization of work and the need to allow
unions and companies flexibility to have their contract follow the work.
The duty to bargain under section 8(a)(5) should allow unions to insist that
collective bargaining agreements address subcontracting, thus allowing
hiring halls to follow the work.91
A more ambitious set of legal reforms would give to worker-owned
employment agencies (which is what hiring halls are) the same legal advantages enjoyed by for-profit employment agencies. Under current law,
unions that operate hiring halls have extensive reporting requirements to
government and disclosure requirements to members. Law should require
non-union, for-profit employment agencies to engage in the same reporting
and disclosure as the law requires of unions. Alternatively, and much more
ambitiously, the law would empower workers through a hiring hall structure that would require that any organization engaged in employment referrals and in interstate commerce either be operated by, or in equal
partnership with, a union or other bona-fide non-profit worker organization
or be operated. Functionally, this would require firms ranging from Kelly
Service and Manpower to Uber and TaskRabbit to enter into labor partnership agreements in order to continue operating their existing lines of business. A slightly less forceful approach would be the labor co-op system
described above: for-profit companies could gain an exemption form certain minimum standards legislation (such as laws designating workers as
employees) if the source their workers from a worker-controlled co-op. 92
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Dimick, supra note 48, at 376.
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93.
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It would also be possible to expand the role of hiring halls to assume
broader functions of unions or Taft-Hartley benefit plans themselves—
benefit administration, training, codetermination, co-enforcement—on a
portable basis. This would require legal changes in the regulation of unions
and in the regulation of benefit plans.
States or municipalities could serve as laboratories for experimentation with hiring halls by provide government funding to hiring halls. Or
they could require any public-sector employer or employer receiving substantial government funds to use the community hiring hall for some or all
of its workforce needs. Alternatively, government could subsidize the training or education of workers on a pro rata share based on the number of
those that are referred.
Any hiring hall would require some source of funding to support the
cost of its operations. The more training it does, or the more benefits or
services it provides, the greater its costs. As with other employment agencies, hiring halls would charge fees to employers, and perhaps dues to its
employee members. Group discounts for these benefits and services would
make membership more attractive. For example, a coalition of different
unions could collaborate to provide substantial services to members at a
very low cost.
Hiring halls could also be the basis of a Ghent system. 93 That is, they
could replace or augment employers or governments as providers of paid
benefits, such as for unemployment, work-related injury, medical, retirement, parental leave, death, or disability. They would receive the funding
from these sources for sustainability, such as through federal and state
grants. Organizing around benefits allows unions to regularly connect with
workers as whole people—who need health care, have children, hope to
retire.
In order for hiring halls to not replicate the grim history of racial, gender, and other forms of exclusion, it is important that hiring hall organizations have operations in low-income, disadvantaged communities. They
should have the elected members monitor compliance with rules so that
they are not discriminatorily applied. The government could also have a
certification requirement to ensure that a certain percentage of the organization’s hiring hall operations are in particular zip codes. In the past, some
hiring halls have been guilty of illegal discrimination, typically in order to
facilitate greater employment and earning opportunities for members of a
dominant racial, ethnic, national, or gender group allied with union leader-
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ship. Diversity in union and worker center leadership, and making hiring
halls open to all, will prevent a recurrence of the old discrimination. Regardless of union affiliation, hiring halls, bilateral labor marketplaces, and
employment placement and referral agencies should be covered by antidiscrimination laws; government agencies should be adequately resourced
to enforce those laws; and government funding and contracts should be
contingent on demonstrating compliance with applicable antidiscrimination laws.
***
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See SAUL ALINSKY, REVEILLE FOR RADICALS (repr. ed/ 1969) (1946).
See FRANK BARDACKE, TRAMPLING OUT THE VINTAGE: CESAR CHAVEZ AND THE TWO
SOULS OF THE UNITED FARM WORKERS 72 (2011) (noting that Alinsky believed that unions were
“languishing precisely because they have institutional power” that enables them “[t]hrough ritualized
contract negotiations . . . [to] win higher wages without the active participation of their members” but
suggesting that Alinsky erred in ignoring the “obvious alternative – for workers to fight within their
unions for democratic unionism”).
96. For example, the Taft-Hartley Act prohibited closed shops (agreements between unions and
employers that the employer would hire only union members). 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3). See, e.g., Pattern
94.
95.
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There is a significant and deeper theoretical debate underlying the
question of whether gaining institutional power will necessarily weaken
labor as a movement. Saul Alinsky, the great theorist of social movement
organizing, apparently thought so, on the ground that stable union contracts
and the periodic rounds of collective bargaining enabled unions to improve
wages and benefits without involving their members.94 Some observers of
the UFW believed that it was the goal of the leadership to keep the movement vibrant by focusing more on Latinx political power and grassroots
community organizing than on negotiating and administering farmworker
labor contracts. Others believe that it was the failure to keep the UFW as a
democratically accountable, member-governed organization that led to its
collapse, not that it gained institutional power through collective bargaining
agreements. 95
The relationship between law, institutional power, and movement vibrance is a huge topic beyond the scope of this essay. There is tension between the tendency toward hierarchy and bureaucratic control inherent in
an institution and the goal of a movement to be democratic, bottom-up, and
voluntaristic. Labor history is a story of struggle to gain and keep power
over wages and working conditions against the constant threat that some
workers will work for less money in order to get a competitive advantage.
Unions have adopted a variety of coercive measures under the name of
solidarity, and courts or legislatures have outlawed most of them.96 History
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has few examples of stable labor unions (or any other institutions) that are
inclusive on the basis of race, class, gender, immigration status, and skill
level, are truly and always voluntary, and are powerful. And in the highly
partisan and rancorous time in which we live, any diverse organization will
encounter difficulty in bridging the things that divide the members and to
find common ground and to promote solidarity strong enough to enable the
workers to get results from oppositional employers.
CONCLUSION
To build enduring worker power from the activism and organizations
of Alt-Labor requires thinking about how law could create institutional
leverage for worker groups. If today’s organizing produces a new wave of
labor power in blue states or nationally, they will be vulnerable to a probusiness counter-revolution. Co-enforcement and legal support for expanded and robust hiring halls are state level legal changes that can make AltLabor movement activism sustainable and are building blocks to sectoral
bargaining.
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Makers’ League v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95 (1985) (invalidating union rules restricting members from
resigning from the union during a strike, even though resignations were done to enable workers to cross
the picket line without repercussions); NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers, 388 U.S. 175 (1967) (upholding the
power of a union to fine members for crossing a picket line; the power to fine is what creates the incentive for members to resign from the union before crossing the picket line).

